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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Fenton’s motion to 
suppress, arguing that the district court erred by failing to correctly apply the doctrine of 
attenuation to this case. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On February 28, 2016, Lewiston Patrol Officer Eylar was running stationary traffic 
enforcement in a marked police car when a red GMC Yukon drove past his location.  
(R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.8, L.11.)  Believing that the Yukon was registered 
to someone Officer Eylar knew (from prior contact) was involved in narcotic activity, he 
chose to follow the vehicle.  (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-15.)  After watching the 
Yukon pull into an A&B Foods store parking lot, Officer Eylar made a loop around the 
block and then pulled into a nearby cemetery from which he could observe the vehicle.  
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.8, L.16 – p.9, L.1.)  Officer Eylar knew from experience that drug 
transactions often occurred at the A&B Foods store.  (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.15-22.) 
Eventually, the Yukon exited on the opposite side, now followed by a white 
Pontiac Grand Prix.  (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.14.)  Officer Eylar 
radioed Officer Stormes requesting backup and then continued to follow the vehicles.  
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.10, L.5.)  Eventually, Officer Eylar observed the vehicles 
park at the Zip Trip gas station, and he pulled into a nearby parking lot to try and keep 
an eye on them.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.10, L.9 – p.11, L.1.)  Officer Stormes then arrived, and 
Officer Eylar conveyed his observations.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-11.)  Believing that 
2 
the occupants of the observed vehicles were waiting for the officers to leave before 
conducting any business, the officers decided that Officer Stormes should leave the 
area.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-18.)   
Shortly after Officer Stormes began to drive away, the Grand Prix also left the 
gas station.  (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.11, Ls.19-23.)  Officer Eylar contacted Officer 
Stormes to inform him that the vehicle had left, and Officer Stormes turned around to 
follow the Grand Prix.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-5; p.18, Ls.16-25.)  Officer Stormes 
radioed dispatch to check the car’s registration, initially reading the license plate as 
“Idaho plate 180728,” but dispatch interpreted “Idaho” as the county and ran the plate 
as “Ida 180728.”  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.20, Ls.9-15.)  Dispatch found no record of that plate.  
(R., p.102.)  Officer Stormes tried replacing the final digit with a “B,” but that, too, failed 
to return a record.  (R., p.102; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.20, Ls.16-20.)  After catching up with the 
Grand Prix, he correctly transmitted the Nez Perce county plate number as “Nora 
180728.”  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-9.)  While a record on that plate did return, the officer 
was not informed of the return until after the investigation was concluded.  (8/4/2016 Tr., 
p.22, Ls.10-14; p.31, L.11 – p.32, L.1.)  Unaware that the plate had returned a record, 
he conducted a traffic stop on Fenton’s vehicle.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.22, Ls.15-24.) 
Officer Stormes contacted Fenton, the driver of the vehicle, and he provided the 
officer with the vehicle’s registration.  (R., p.103; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.22, L.25 – p.23, L23.)  
Officer Stormes also requested Fenton’s driver’s license and proof of insurance, both of 
which he lacked, so the officer wrote-out citations for both violations.  (R., p.103; 
8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.3-9.)  Then, as he returned Fenton’s documents and issued those 
citations, Fenton volunteered that he was on probation.  (R., p.103; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, 
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Ls.16-25; see also DVD at 30:30-31:00.)  Officer Stormes withheld the second citation 
and, following standard procedures, contacted the probation office.  (R., p.103; 8/4/2016 
Tr., p.25, Ls.12-22.)  Officer Stormes spoke with Probation Officer Jensen, told her that 
he had pulled over Fenton and cited him, and relayed Officer Eylar’s observations of 
potential drug activity.  (R., p.103; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.23; see also DVD at 
32:30-35:30.)  Probation Officer Jensen decided she would come to the location of the 
stop to search Fenton’s car.  (R., p.104; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4.)  Officer Stormes 
then returned and gave Fenton the remaining citation, let him know that the probation 
officer was on her way and had requested Fenton to remain, and then turned off his 
vehicle’s overhead lights.  (R., p.104; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.9.)   
Roughly ten minutes later, Probation Officer Jensen arrived on scene.  (8/4/2016 
Tr., p.27, Ls.10-15.)  She had Fenton step out of the vehicle and sit on the sidewalk, 
and then requested Officer Stormes’ assistance to conduct a search of the vehicle.1  
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.16-25.)  As they began searching the vehicle, Fenton fled on 
foot.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.28, L.11 – p.29, L.3.)  As several officers went to apprehend 
Fenton, Officer Stormes, later joined by Probation Officer Jensen, completed the 
search.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.29, Ls.4-6.)  The officers seized large bags of crystalline 
                                            
1  In addition to several minor errors throughout its factual background, the district court 
notes that “when the probation officer arrived she asked Fenton to step out of the 
vehicle and he was handcuffed for officer safety reasons.”  (R., p.104.)  In fact, Fenton 
conceded that he was not handcuffed during the encounter.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.4, L.12 – 
p.5, L.6.)  Rather, while the probation officer may have “suggested that [the officers] 
should handcuff Mr. Fenton” (5/18/2016 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-17), Fenton “was not 
handcuffed at that point” but was “simply told to sit on the curb” (8/4/2016 Tr., p.28, 
Ls.1-3; see also DVD at 47:15-49:00).  If Fenton was ever handcuffed, that would have 
occurred when he was re-apprehended following his flight, and after the search of his 
vehicle was already completed. 
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substance, later identified as methamphetamine.  (R., p.104; 8/4/2016 Tr., p.29, Ls.6-
20.) 
The state charged Fenton with trafficking in methamphetamine.  (R., p.52.)  
Fenton filed a motion to suppress the evidence acquired during the probation search, 
asserting that both his traffic stop and probation search were unlawful.  (R., pp.66-75.)  
The district court held a hearing on the suppression motion (R., pp.87-88; see also 
8/4/2016 Tr.) and, following that hearing, granted Fenton’s suppression motion on the 
ground that the traffic stop was unlawful (R., pp.101-09).  The state requested 
reconsideration based on the doctrine of attenuation (R., pp.116-18), which the district 
court subsequently denied (R., pp.175-79).  The state filed a notice of appeal timely 










The District Court Erred When It Granted Fenton’s Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
The state does not challenge the district court’s analysis in relation to the 
reasonableness of Officer Stormes’ mistake of fact when, based on his 
miscommunication with dispatch regarding Fenton’s license plate, he pulled over the 
vehicle believing it lacked valid registration.  (See R., pp.104-09.)  Whether the officer’s 
mistake was reasonable is irrelevant in this case because the resulting traffic 
investigation did not produce evidence.  Rather, the evidence in this case was 
discovered during a valid probation search, which was distinct from Officer Stormes’ 
initial detention.  Application of the relevant legal standards shows that, because the 
evidence was acquired during a valid search, the district court erred when it granted 
Fenton’s suppression motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 
843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). 
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C. The Search Of Fenton’s Vehicle Was A Valid Probation Search To Which Fenton 
Consented As A Condition Of Probation 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”  Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done 
pursuant to consent.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).  Freely and 
voluntarily given consent validates a search.  Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations 
omitted).  When a probationer or parolee, as an express term of his release, has waived 
his right to be free from a warrantless search, such warrantless searches are valid.  
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 209, 207 P.3d 182, 185 (2009) (citing State v. Gawron, 
112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)).   
At the time of the contested search, Fenton was on probation.  (R., p.103; 
8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.19-25.)  At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the 
admission of Fenton’s probation agreement (8/4/2016 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-25), which the 
prosecutor attached as an exhibit to his closing brief (R., pp.98-100).  The terms and 
conditions of Fenton’s probation, as shown by the agreement, included a waiver of his 
Fourth Amendment rights regarding searches, under which he agreed to  
consent to the search of his person, residence, vehicle, personal property, 
and other real property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or 
for which the defendant is the controlling authority.  The search will be 
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conducted by the IDOC district manager, section supervisor, or PPO or 
law enforcement officer.  The defendant waives his Fourth Amendment 
rights concerning searches. 
 
(R., p.153 (emphasis added).)  Because Fenton specifically consented to “search[es] of 
his … vehicle” that were “conducted by the … PPO” and waived his Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from warrantless searches, the warrantless search in this case, which 
was conducted under the probation officer’s authority, was valid. 
Below, Fenton argued that his initial detention was unlawful (R., pp.70-73) and 
the district court agreed (R., pp.104-09).2  In its motion seeking reconsideration, the 
state correctly noted that, even if the initial detention had been unlawful, the probation 
search was still valid under the doctrine of attenuation.  (R., pp.116-18.)  The district 
court, however, held “[i]n this case, but for the officer’s error, the Defendant’s vehicle 
would not have been stopped, and the probation officer would not have been 
contacted—thus a search would not have occurred.”  (R., p.179.)  But that is not the 
correct legal test.  While the inquiry may begin with a “but for” analysis, it does not end 
there; not “all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have 
come to light but for illegal actions of the police.”  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 487-88 (1963).  “Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
                                            
2  Fenton also asserted that the probation search was invalid because it was not based 
on reasonable suspicion that Fenton had violated his probation.  (R., pp.73-75.)  This 
argument fails.  Even assuming the probation officer lacked reasonable suspicion of a 
violation, as shown above, reasonable suspicion was not required to conduct the search 
of Fenton’s car under the terms of his probation, to which he voluntarily agreed. 
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distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”  Id. at 488 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).   
In State v. Page, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a three factor test to 
determine whether unlawful conduct had been adequately attenuated.  Id., 140 Idaho at 
846, 103 P.3d at 459.  “The factors are: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct 
and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, 
and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.”  Id. (citation 
omitted); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).  No one factor is 
dispositive and not all must be resolved in favor of the state before the doctrine of 
attenuation becomes applicable.  See State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6 
P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000).  “The test only requires a balancing of the relative 
weights of all the factors, viewed together, in order to determine if the police exploited 
an illegality to discover evidence.”  Id. (citing United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 
549-550 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
In Page, the officer contacted the defendant when he saw him carrying some 
bags and walking down the middle of the road at 2:00 a.m.  Id., 140 Idaho at 455-56, 
103 P.3d at 842-43.  The officer took Page’s driver’s license to verify his identification 
through dispatch, and learned that Page had an outstanding warrant for his arrest.  Id. 
at 56, 103 P.3d at 843.  The officer then arrested Page and, during a search incident to 
that arrest, discovered contraband.  Id.  Page sought, and was granted, suppression by 
the district court, and the state appealed.  Id. 
The Court determined that, though the initial encounter was lawful, when the 
officer seized Page’s driver’s license he illegally detained Page.  Id. at 845, 103 P.3d at 
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458.  However, applying the three factor test, the Court determined that the discovery of 
the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the primary illegality and reversed the 
district court.  Id. at 846-47, 103 P.3d at 459-60.  Though there was a minimal time-
lapse between the illegal seizure and the search pursuant to the valid arrest warrant, 
the “officer’s conduct was not flagrant, nor was his purpose improper.”  Id.  Once the 
officer discovered the warrant—an intervening event—he was justified in arresting 
Page.  Id.  Once he had arrested Page, he could lawfully search him incident to that 
arrest.  Id.  “Therefore, it was not unlawful for the officer to seize the drugs discovered 
incident to that arrest.”  Id. 
The Court cautioned, however, “that had the drug evidence in this case been 
seized after the officer seized Page’s license and took it back to the patrol vehicle, but 
prior to discovery of the valid warrant,” the doctrine of attenuation would not apply.  Id. 
at 847, 103 P.3d at 460. 
In such a case, evidence seized prior to the arrest, unless justified by 
some other exception, would not be admissible simply because, 
ultimately, a valid arrest warrant was discovered.  A judicial determination 
of probable cause focuses on the information and facts the officers 
possessed at the time.  It is only the fact that there was an intervening 
factor between the unlawful seizure and discovery of the evidence—the 
discovery of the warrant in this case—that creates the exception, which 
permitted the officer to arrest Page and made the subsequent seizure of 
the evidence admissible. 
 
Id. 
More recently, the United States Supreme Court applied this same three factor 
test in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016).  In that case, following an anonymous tip 
of drug activity, officers conducted surveillance on a home where they observed visitors 
frequently departing within minutes of arriving at the house.  Id. at 2059.  After Strieff 
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exited the house, an officer detained him and took his identification card.  Id. at 2060.  
Running Strieff’s information through dispatch, the officer learned that Strieff had an 
outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation.  Id.  The officer arrested Strieff on the 
warrant and, during a search incident to that arrest, discovered a baggie of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.  Id. 
Strieff sought suppression of the evidence, arguing that his detention was 
unlawful.  Id.  The state conceded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the 
initial detention, but argued that “the existence of a valid arrest warrant attenuated the 
connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the contraband.”  Id.  
Applying the three factor test, the United States Supreme Court agreed.  Id. at 2061-63.  
First, the temporal proximity between the initially unlawful detention and the discovery of 
evidence favored suppression.  Id. at 2062.  But, second, the presence of intervening 
circumstances—in this case, the arrest warrant—strongly favored attenuation.  Id.  As 
the Supreme Court noted, “the warrant was valid, it predated [the officer’s] investigation, 
and it was entirely unconnected with the stop.”  Id.  And, third, the officer’s conduct was 
not flagrant; at most it was negligent.  Id. at 2063.  There was “no indication that [the] 
unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”  Id. 
Even assuming the primary illegality of Fenton’s initial detention, application of 
the forgoing legal standards to this case shows that there was no exploitation of that 
alleged illegality.  Officer Stormes conducted a traffic stop on Fenton’s vehicle based on 
misreading Fenton’s license plate, which failed to return proper registration through 
dispatch.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.19, L.11 – p.22, L.24.)  The subsequent traffic investigation 
conducted by the officer yielded two minor infractions—failure to purchase a license and 
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failure to provide proof of insurance.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.3-9.)  Officer Stormes 
wrote-out both citations and then, while returning Fenton’s documents and citations, 
Fenton volunteered that he was on probation.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.16-25.)  Based on 
the terms and conditions of that probation, as shown above, Officer Stormes could have 
then conducted a search of Fenton.  (See R., p.153.)  But he did not.  Instead, the 
officer withheld a single citation and, in accordance with standard procedures, contacted 
the probation office.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.25, Ls.12-22.) 
Officer Stormes reached Probation Officer Jensen and relayed the incident of the 
traffic stop and Officer Eylar’s observations of potential drug activity.  (8/4/2016 Tr., 
p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.23.)  Based on that information, Probation Officer Jensen decided 
she would come to the stop and search Fenton’s car.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4.)  
Officer Stormes then gave Fenton the remaining citation, let him know that the probation 
officer was on her way and had requested Fenton to remain, and then turned off his 
vehicle’s overhead lights.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.9.)  At that point, Fenton 
was no longer being detained by Officer Stormes in connection with the traffic 
investigation; he was detained at the probation officer’s request—which is consistent 
with another of the conditions of Fenton’s probation requiring him to give probation 
officers access to his “vehicle for the purpose of … inspections, or other supervision 
functions.”  (R., p.154.)  About ten minutes later, Probation Officer Jensen arrived to 
conduct a search of Fenton’s vehicle, during which the evidence was discovered.  
(8/4/2016 Tr., p.27, Ls.10-15; p.29, Ls.4-20.) 
Though this case may not have the same intervening circumstance as was 
present in both Page and Strieff—an active arrest warrant—the intervening 
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circumstances that exist in this case are at least as strong.  The search of Fenton’s 
vehicle occurred after the initial traffic stop had been completed and all citations had 
been issued to Fenton.  That search was conducted on Probation Officer Jenson’s 
authority, not Officer Stormes’ authority, and it was Probation Officer Jenson’s decision 
to search the vehicle, not Officer Stormes’ decision.  It appears Probation Officer 
Jenson made that decision, not based on information learned during the traffic stop—
the traffic investigation only yielded two minor traffic infractions—but on the report of 
Officer Eylar’s observations of potential drug activity.  (See 8/4/2016 Tr., p.26, Ls.3-23.)  
Those observations occurred before the traffic stop and so could not have been tainted 
by it.  Finally, Officer Stormes learned that Fenton was on probation, not by running his 
records through dispatch, but because Fenton volunteered that information.  The many 
intervening circumstances in this case weigh strongly in favor of attenuation. 
Moreover, while there is some temporal proximity between the initial detention 
and the discovery of the evidence, that proximity is far more remote than in either Strieff 
or Page.  The traffic investigation had been completed in this case, and Fenton was 
only detained on the probation officer’s request.  As the much nearer temporal proximity 
in Strieff merely “favor[ed] suppressing the evidence,” as compared to the factors which 
“strongly favor[ed] the State,” see id., 136 S.Ct. at 2062, the lesser temporal proximity in 
this case should, at most, weakly favor suppression. 
Finally, as in Strieff, there is no indication that the stop here was part of any 
systemic or recurrent police misconduct.  The officer did not flagrantly abuse his 
authority; he made a mistake when reading Fenton’s license plate.  The lack of 
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flagrancy in the officer’s arguably invalid traffic stop, like the several intervening 
circumstances in this case, weighs strongly in favor of attenuation. 
Taken together, the balance of the relevant legal factors strongly favors 
attenuation.  Even assuming that Fenton’s initial detention was illegal, Fenton’s later 
probation search was still valid because the probation officer did not exploit any primary 
illegality.  That probation search resulted in the discovery of the evidence Fenton sought 
to suppress.  Because the evidence was acquired during the valid probation search, the 
district court erred when it granted Fenton’s suppression motion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
granting Fenton’s suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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